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PEOPLE v. JONES-THE JURY MUST BE
DRAWN FROM THE DISTRICT OF
THE CRIME
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees a criminal defendant the right to be tried by a jury of the district
of the crime.1 It might appear obvious to a layman that this constitu-
tional right was violated when a defendant was tried by a jury of the
Southwest District of Los Angeles County for a crime committed in
the Central District. The California Supreme Court, however, arrived
at this conclusion in People v. Jones2 by a four to three split decision.
Both the majority and the dissent purported to base their re-
spective positions upon the Sixth Amendment. The dissent interpreted
the Sixth Amendment as permitting the federal judicial district to be
the district of the crime from which state juries may be selected; on the
other hand, the majority interpreted the Sixth Amendment as requir-
ing that the relevant jury selection district created by state legislation
must be considered the district of the crime for Sixth Amendment
purposes.4  In support of the differing interpretations of the Sixth
Amendment, each side cited cases from other jurisdictions5 and at-
tempted to discredit the other side's arguments. But by looking no
further than to the Sixth Amendment and to decisions from other ju-
risdictions, each side failed to address the relevant policy considera-
tions which the Jones case presented to the California Supreme Court.6
This note will explain why no compelling authority for either the
majority's or the dissent's position can be located in the legislative his-
tory of the Sixth Amendment or in prior case law. This note con-
cludes that because of the lack of authority both the majority's and the
dissent's positions must have been based upon policy considerations
which were not discussed explicitly. The note will examine the policy
considerations which the supreme court should have, but failed to dis-
cuss, including the historical concept of a jury district in relation to
current jury districts, the interest of the accused in the jury, the inter-
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
2. 9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973).
3. Id. at 558-59, 510 P.2d at 714, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
4. Id. at 554, 556, 510 P.2d at 711-12, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351-52.
5. See notes 105-109 and accompanying text infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 110-112 infra.
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est of society in the jury, and the interest of society in the opportunity
for all individuals to serve as jurors. That examination reveals that
the majority reached the result most compatible with society's interests.
Further probing into the legislative history of the Sixth Amend-
ment reveals two reasonable bases on which the majority opinion might
have rested. In addition to suggesting these two explanations, this
note will discuss the scope of both the majority's holding and the two
exceptions to that holding which the majority stated in dicta. Finally,
there will be a brief discussion of four possible implications of the
Jones holding for future California cases.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law . ... 7 The terms criminal prosecution, 8 speedy,9
public, 1° and impartial jury'1 have been the subject of so many United
States Supreme Court decisions that the contour of each is reasonably
well defined. By contrast, the word district has received very little at-
tention and its contour is largely undefined. 12  The Jones case merits
attention because it marks one of the few times since Duncan v. Louisi-
ana"1 held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is applicable
to the states when the requirement that a jury must be drawn from the
district of the crime has been given extended consideration.'"
People v. Jones
Leon Dwight Jones was tried in the Southwest Superior Court
District (Southwest District) of Los Angeles County by a jury drawn
exclusively from that district and found guilty of three counts of selling
marijuana.1 5 On appeal his convictions were reversed by a divided
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
8. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); District of Columbia
v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
9. See, e.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S.
374 (1969); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959).
10. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
11. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
12. See notes 96-97 and accompanying text infra.
13. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
14. Since Duncan this requirement has been given careful attention in Maryland
v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969) and Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alas.
1971). It has been applied with very little discussion in several other cases. E.g.,
United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972); State v. Kappos, 189 N.W.2d
563 (Iowa 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 982 (1972).
15. 9 Cal. 3d at 547-48, 510 P.2d at 706-07, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47.
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California Supreme Court on the ground that residents of the Central
Superior Court District (Central District) where the crimes occurred
had been excluded from the jury panel of the Southwest District.",
The issue which divided the Jones court was how best to determine
the precise nature of the vicinage requirement of the Sixth Amend-
ment. The majority and the dissent agreed there is a vicinage require-
ment, that is, that the trial must be held before a jury of the district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.17 They also agreed
that this requirement has been an essential feature of state jury trials
since Duncan.' They further agreed that the Sixth Amendment's
vicinage provision never did connote the identical meaning it had ac-
quired in England.' 9 Instead, by the clause "shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law," the entire Jones court thought that the
Sixth Amendment left to legislatures the opportunity to define the
vicinage requirement by creation of districts. They disagreed only as
to which legislative bodies were allowed to define jury selection dis-
tricts for vicinage purposes.
The Jones dissent thought that only federal legislation could de-
fine the districts for the purpose of the Sixth Amendment vicinage re-
quirement.2 0  It based this belief upon the fact that the federal Judi-
ciary Act of 178921 which created federal judicial districts had been
passed only a day before the Sixth Amendment had been recommended
to the states by Congress. 2  Under the dissent's view, the geographical
distribution of the jury would have satisfied the Sixth Amendment if
the jury had been drawn from any part of the federal judicial district
in which the crime was committed; that is, the locale of the crime need
not have been included in the geographical area from which the jury
was selected.
By contrast, the majority held that if smaller jury selection dis-
tricts had been created within a federal district, a crime committed
within one of those districts could not be tried by a jury drawn exclu-
sively from other districts.23 In Jones, those smaller districts were the
judicial districts which had been drawn by the state legislature.24 The
16. Id. at 556, 510 P.2d at 712, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
17. Id. at 551, 558, 510 P.2d at 709, 714, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 349, 354.
18. Id.
19. Id. In Blackstone's England, "vicinage" meant neighborhood, and jurors "of
the vicinage" meant a jury of the neighborhood. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TA Es *350-51.
20. 9 Cal. 3d at 558-59, 510 P.2d at 714, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
21. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73.
22. 9 Cal. 3d at 558-59, 510 P.2d at 714, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 354; F. HELLER, THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTMTTON 94 (1951) [hereinafter cited as HELLER].
23. See 9 Cal. 3d at 554, 556, 510 P.2d at 711-12, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351-52.
24. The Jones principle that "[t]he district, however large or small, from which
the jury is drawn must include the area wherein the crime was committed," 9 Cal. 3d
authority for the majority's position that state legislation could define
districts for vicinage purposes is difficult to ascertain. In reaching that
position, the majority examined neither prior United States Supreme
Court decisions nor its own prior decisions; it also failed to explain
the basis for its position in its discussion of the intent of the First
Congress, which had recommended the Sixth Amendment for ratifica-
tion by the states. It proffered only two decisions from other juris-
dictions in support of its position.2 5  Since neither of these two deci-
sions is binding authority for a California court, the majority's hold-
ing must have been based on policy considerations. 6
The Vicinage Requirement: Community or Cross-section?
In Jones, the Central District, where the crime occurred, was 31
percent black, while the Southwest District, from which the jury was
drawn, was 7 percent black.27  The defendant alleged he was denied
his constitutional right to a trial by a jury representing a cross-section
of the district where the crime had been committed. 28  Thus, the ques-
tions of how the district should be defined and of whether Jones had
been denied his right to a jury representing a cross-section of the com-
munity29 were intertwined. However, the Jones majority's treatment
of Alvarado v. State,30 the principal case on which it relied, showed
that its decision was based upon the vicinage requirement of the Sixth
Amendment rather than upon the requirement of a cross-section.
The crime in Alvarado was committed by a Native Alaskan in a
small Alaskan village located 450 air miles from Anchorage, where
the trial was held. Ninety-five of the one hundred inhabitants of his
village were Alaska Natives. By virture of a fifteen mile jury selection
radius, residents of the village of the crime and residents of nearly all
at 554, 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351, would on its face apply equally well
to federally drawn divisions within federal districts. However, the majority was not
required to decide if the same principle would apply to federal divisions.
25. Maryland v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969); Alvarado v. State, 486
P.2d 891 (Alas. 1971). See text accompanying notes 31-36 & 46-51 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 105-109 infra.
27. 9 Cal. 3d at 555, 510 P.2d at 711-12, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351-52.
28. Id. at 551, 510 P.2d at 709, Cal. Rptr. at 349.
29. "The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by [the Su-
preme] Court as a requirement of equal protection, in cases vindicating the right of
a Negro defendant to challenge the systematic exclusion of Negroes from his grand
and petit juries. E.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 . . . (1940) .... Finally it
emerged as an aspect of the constitutional right to jury trial in Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 100 . . . (1970)." Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 n.9 (1972). For
a discussion of the cross-section requirement see Note, The Jury, 20 HASTINGS L.J.
1417, 1435-40 (1969).
30. 486 P.2d 891 (Alas. 1971).
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other native villages were excluded from the jury selection pool.81 The
Alaska Supreme Court found the jury selection procedure invalid for
this crime, because it was committed outside the fifteen mile radius. 82
The court stated that "the traditional starting point for determining
the community from which jurors are to be selected is the scene of the
alleged offense. '3 3  However, it backed away from this language when
discussing the possible implications of its position. It conceded that
a jury drawn from a selected area within a judicial district might be
proper even if the scene of the crime were excluded, provided that the
population of the restricted area did not differ significantly from that
of the entire district.3 4  By this concession, the Alaska court appar-
ently was intent upon satisfying the principle that a jury should ideally
represent a cross-section of the community rather than upon defining
what the community should mean.
The Jones majority apparently adopted without reservation the
position that the community from which the jury is drawn must in-
clude the scene of the crime, stating that "even if the two judicial dis-
tricts had contained an identical proportion of Negroes, defendant would
still be entitled to a jury drawn from a panel including residents of the
judicial district where the crime was committed. '3'  Thus, the Jones
holding is grounded upon the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement
and is not tied to the principle that a jury should represent a cross-sec-
tion of the community. In other words, the Jones majority concen-
trated upon the meaning of community and not upon the requirement
of a cross-section. 6
Jones Court's Neglect of the Racial Issue
Since the transfer of Jones's trial from a district with 31 percent
blacks to one with 7 percent blacks 7 indicates that there was at least
31. id. at 892-95.
32. See id. at 904.
33. Id. at 902.
34. Id. at n.29.
35. 9 Cal. 3d at 555, 510 P.2d at 712, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
36. The Jones dissent cited United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970),
and People v. McDowell, 27 Cal. App. 3d 864, 104 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972) to discredit
what it termed the majority's "inferential and unwritten conclusion" that Jones was
denied a jury which reflected a cross-section of his "community." 9 Cal. 3d at 561,
510 P.2d at 716, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 356. Both cases contain language which could be
used to challenge a contention that geographic groups are protected by the cross-section
principle. Compare United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 572 (1st Cir. 1970), with
People v. McDowell, 27 Cal. App. 3d 864, 875, 104 Cal. Rptr. 181, 188 (1972). How-
ever, since the Jones majority did not rely upon the cross-section principle, the dissent's
citing them for that purpose was a meaningless exercise.
37. 9 Cal. 3d at 555, 510 P.2d at 711-12, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351-52. The Jones
majority admitted that this Was a "seriou. difference." Id.
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a possible racial issue in Jones, one may ask why the majority chose
to base its decision upon geographical considerations rather than upon
racial or cross-sectional considerations. Perhaps an explanation for this
choice by the majority can be found in the United States Supreme Court
decision of Swain v. AlabamaAs There, the black petitioner proved
that although 26 percent of the male population of jury duty age was
black, only 10 to 15 percent of the grand and petit jury panel mem-
bers since 1953 had been black.39 The Supreme Court held that "pur-
poseful discrimination based on race" was not proved by this underrepre-
sentation of 10 percent. 40  However, as one commentator has observed
about Swain: "[c]learly the percentage relied upon by the Court, which
was presumably derived by simply subtracting 15 % from 26 %, is plain
error. Blacks were actually underrepresented by almost 50%." l The
percentages in Swain are not greatly different from the Jones statistics.
Thus, the Jones majority may have decided that it should base its de-
cision upon geographical considerations rather than confront the ob-
stacle created by the Supreme Court's decision in Swain.
Two Exceptions to the Jones Doctrine
Inconvenience and Cost
Although the Jones holding that the jury must be drawn from an
area which includes the scene of the crime appears to be clear and
easy to apply,42 the majority left the decision open to further judicial
clarification by its recognition of two exceptions. The majority pre-
sented the first exception by conceding that its holding did not "say
that there may not be an exceptional case where inconvenience and
cost could constitute sufficiently compelling reasons"43 for excluding
residents in the district where the crime was committed from the jury
pool. It is difficult to predict what effect that statement will have on
future jury selection and trial transfer procedures. One can predict
confidently, however, that prosecutors faced with Jones-based defenses
will exert every effort to bring their cases within that exception. Thus
the scope of the exception should be examined closely.
Other parts of the opinion of the Jones majority indicate that the
exception for inconvenience and cost is a very narrow one. In the
38. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
39. Id. at 205.
40. Id. at 208-09.
41. Kairys, Juror Selection: The Law, A Mathematical Method of Analysis, and
a Case Study, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771, 776-77 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kairys].
42. Under normal circumstances a California court now needs only to examine
the jury selection pool, ascertain whether it contained residents from the area of the
crime, and then base its decision upon that finding.
43. 9 Cal. 3d at 555-56, 510 P.2d at 712, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
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sentence immediately preceding the above-quoted phrase, the majority
recognized that "if convenience and cost were deemed sufficient to jus-
tify the exclusion from the jury panel of residents in the district where
the crime was committed, the People could defeat this constitutional
right by merely changing venue." 44  Thus, the inconvenience and cost
which would permit exclusion must be more than that which normally
accompanies a change of venue. But how much more inconvenience
and cost is needed than that associated with a typical change of venue?
A clue to the answer to that question may be found in the majority's
reliance upon Maryland v. Brown.45
Brown involved a petition in federal court by H. Rap Brown for
removal from the Maryland courts to the federal district court of his
state prosecution for rioting, arson and inciting to riot, on the ground
that he could not enforce his rights in the state courts. Over Brown's
objection, the state court had granted the prosecution's motion for a
change of venue on the ground that neither Brown nor the State could
receive a fair, orderly and impartial trial in Dorchester County where
the alleged crimes had occurred.46 There was testimony in the state
court that the public awareness of the events and tensions created by
the civil disorder leading to his indictment would jeopardize a fair trial
since it would be difficult to obtain proper courtroom security and
atmosphere during the trial.4 7 The concern apparently was not that
impartial jurors could not be found, but that the conduct of the trial
itself would be prejudiced by the extreme security measures which
would be required.
One of Brown's contentions was that this change of venue to
Harford County would deny him the right to trial by a jury of the
district where the crime was committed.4 The federal court denied
the petition for removal and stated that Brown might be entitled to
have a jury selected from Dorchester County even though the trial
would be transferred to Harford County. This right was dependent
upon obtaining a fair and impartial jury composed of residents of Dor-
chester County.4
The Jones majority's approval of Brown indicates that the incon-
venience and cost of transferring jurors to a county approximately one
hundred miles5" away is not enough for the majority to justify exclud-
ing residents of the district of the crime. Thus, the supreme court's
exception appears to be very narrow; it would justify excluding resi-
44. Id. at 555, 510 P.2d at 712, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
45. 295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
46. Id. at 69-71.
47. Id. at 70.
48. Id. at 72.
49. Id. at 77, 82.
50. Id. at 78.
dents of the district of the crime only where the trial could not be
held within one hundred miles or more from the scene of the crime.
A trial would probably rarely need to be moved further than one hun-
dred miles from the scene of the crime; a move to any city outside
the range of public concern would be sufficient to insure the proper
security and atmosphere for a fair trial. Therefore, the courts prob-
ably would be faced only rarely with a situation where inconvenience
and cost might constitute sufficiently compelling reasons for excluding
residents of the district of the crime.
Impartial Jury
By adopting the language of Brown, the Jones majority appar-
ently adopted a second exception to the requirement that the jury be
drawn from the district of the crime. The majority quoted from Brown
that "a defendant would seem to have no right to be tried by a jury
which is selected from a population base which includes such residents
if a fair and impartial jury cannot thereby be provided ... ."' This
exception recognizes that in a particular case there may be a conflict
between the dual Sixth Amendment requirements that the jury must
be impartial as well as selected from the district of the crime. -52  Al-
though the Jones majority did not express its position in its own lan-
guage, its adoption of this language from Brown indicates that if these
two guarantees came into conflict, the impartial jury requirement should
prevail.
These two exceptions preclude a mechanical application of Jones
by California courts. In every case the court must be prepared to de-
termine if the jury has been drawn from a pool which includes resi-
dents of the area of the crime. If the trial is transferred on the mo-
tion of the prosecution the trial court must decide if the inconvenience
and cost of transporting a jury justify overriding the vicinage require-
ment. Further, regardless of whether the trial is transferred the court
must be prepared to decide if it is possible to empanel an impartial
jury from the district of the crime.
The Vicinage Requirement in Historical Perspective
Framers' Intent
Both the majority and the dissent looked to the intentions of the
framers of the Sixth Amendment to determine what was meant by the
phrase "which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."53
51. 9 Cal. 3d at 553, 510 P.2d at 710, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 350, quoting from Mary-
land v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63, 83 (D. Md. 1969) (emphasis added).
52. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
53. 9 Cal. 3d at 550-51, 558-59, 510 P.2d at 708-09, 714, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 348-
49, 354.
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Since the legislative history was incomplete, however, the two sides
were forced to rely upon contradictory inferences which they drew from
circumstantial evidence of the framers' intent.
James Madison prepared the amendments which were to become
the Bill of Rights and introduced them in the House of Representa-
fives of the First Congress." In its original form, the amendment re-
lating to jury trial in criminal cases contained a requirement that "the
trial of all crimes . . . shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of
the vicinage . . . ." The amendment passed the House in substan-
tially that form, but after more than a week of debate in the Senate
it returned to the House in considerably altered form.5 6 Following a
conference between representatives of the Senate and House, the
amendment reappeared containing the requirement of an "impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."'57
It was in this form that it was submitted to, and ratified by, the states.
Because there is no information available about the proceedings in the
Senate and because information about the proceedings of the House
and the joint conference is sketchy, there is no definitive explanation
of how the vicinage provision reached its final form. 58  Professor
Francis Heller has suggested that it is equally likely that it was sug-
gested as a compromise in the conference committee or proposed on
the floor of the House or agreed upon in informal discussion.59
Since the majority and the dissent in Jones were unable to dis-
cover the express intent of the framers, they both relied upon infer-
ences drawn from the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
Sixth Amendment by Congress. Both sides agreed that it was signifi-
cant that the Judiciary Act of 1789 had been passed the day before
Congress recommended the amendment to the states.60 Both inferred
from this that the districts to be "ascertained by law" were the federal
judicial districts described either by the Judiciary Act or by future
federal legislation. 61 But in contrast to the dissent, the majority did
not accept this as a complete understanding of the district from which
the jury must be drawn. It held that federal legislation merely defined
the outer limits of the district and that when state legislatures created
judicial districts, those were the districts to which the vicinage require-
54. HELLER, supra note 22, at 28.
55. 1 ANNALs oF CONG. 435 (1789), quoted in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
94 (1970).
56. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 94 (1970).
57. HELLER, supra note 22, at 33.
58. See id. at 31-34.
59. Id. at 34.
60. 9 Cal. 3d at 554, 558-59, 510 P.2d at 711, 714, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351, 354.
61. Id.
ment of the Sixth Amendment referred.2 However, since the majority
did not explain where it derived the "immutable mandate" that the
"district, however large or small, from which the jury is drawn must
include the area wherein the crime was committed, '6 3 its legislative in-
terpretation cannot be evaluated. One can only assume that it read
between the lines of the Sixth Amendment to reach a result which it
judged consistent with the purposes of the amendment.
Even if a complete record of the debates and conferences had been
available to the Jones court, the intent of the First Congress would
still have been an "elusive quarry."64  But without such information,
neither the majority's nor the dissent's interpretation can be judged as
clearly superior. The history which is available can be examined and
inferences can be drawn, but a definitive understanding of the intent
of the framers cannot be achieved.
Application of the Sixth Amendment to the States-Two Possible
Explanations for the Majority Position
Even though the majority did not explain what circumstances
surrounding the process of enacting the Sixth Amendment would in-
dicate that the First Congress intended the vicinage provision to apply
to state districts, an analysis of the treatment of the vicinage require-
ment by the First Congress provides one possible explanation. The
concept of a jury from the neighborhood was an element of the English
jury system and stemmed from the early practice of using jurors who
would be familiar with the contested facts.6 5  At least some of the
Colonies incorporated this concept of vicinage into their laws;66 it was
also a provision in the Declaration of Rights of the Continental Con-
gress in 1774.67 Nonetheless, the Constitution failed to include a nar-
rowly drawn vicinage requirement;68 for that reason among others, it
62. Id. at 554, 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
63. Id.
64. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92 (1970). Professor G6ny has pointed
out than an attempt to find legislative intent proceeds from at least two assumptions
which are patently false: (1) That the codifier intended to furnish an answer to all
problems which would arise in the future within the ambit of the code, and (2) That
the codifier was successful in carrying out such an ambitious scheme. GENY, MPTHODE,
discussed in J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 217 (1964).
65. HELLER, supra note 22, at 8.
66. The Charter of Fundamental Laws of 1676 of West Jersey contained a re-
quirement that the jury be "men of the neighborhood." Id. at 17. The Virginia Bill
of Rights required a jury of the vicinage. Id. at 23. The Georgia Constitution of 1777
guaranteed trial within the county of the crime. Id. at 21 & n.54.
67. Id. at 21 & n.54.
68. A "narrowly drawn requirement" would specifically guarantee a jury of the
vicinage which would have the common law interpretation of a jury of the neighbor-
hood. It would thus have been an inflexible concept, subject to change only as the
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was vigorously attacked in state constitutional conventions. 69 These
attacks were successfully rebutted by arguments that knowledge of the
neighborhood was no longer essential to the performance of the jury's
function 70 and that the diversity in state jury vicinage practices pre-
cluded any enactment of a more detailed constitutional provision. 71
James Madison described this diversity in a letter to Edmund Pendle-
ton: "In many of the States juries, even in criminal cases, are taken
from the State at large; in others, from districts of considerable extent;
in very few from the county alone."72  There were subsequent at-
tempts to include a narrowly drawn vicinage requirement in the Bill
of Rights, but these attempts also were unsuccessful because of the
diversity in state practices.73
Although the Jones majority did not make this argument, the
fact that diverse state practices apparently helped defeat a narrow vic-
inage requirement can be interpreted to support the majority's position
that state legislation may affect the Sixth Amendment's vicinage re-
quirement. If state legislation were not included in the phrase "which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law," then the choice
of that phrase rather than a more narrowly drawn vicinage require-
ment would not have protected the diversity in state practices. If
the Sixth Amendment permits only federal legislation to define effec-
tively the vicinage requirement, then the diversity in state practices had
already been undermined by the 1789 federal Judiciary Act. In 1789,
all but two of the federally drawn districts were state-wide;74 thus, the
neighborhood concept of some of the states would have been destroyed
by that act. Under the Jones majority view, whenever a state defines
neighborhood should change. The narrow requirement contrasts with the broad, flex-
ible Sixth Amendment provision whereby the framers permitted legislation to alter the
nature of the district. See id. at 22-26.
69. Patrick Henry and William Grayson of Virginia and John Holmes of Massa-
chusetts were among those who predicted that the jury could be used as a weapon
against the people. They reasoned that if a jury could be chosen from any part of
the state, it could be chosen to suit the purpose of those in power. Id. at 25-26.
Professor Heller suggests that the emotion of these attacks may be partially attributed
to a reaction against the English practice of removing prisoners for trial to England
or to another colony; he also points out a possible confusion between venue and vici-
nage on the part of these men. Id. at 93.
70. Id. at 27.
71. This argument was stated in reports of the state conventions on adoption of
the federal constitution. In the Massachusetts convention it was stated that only by
reason of the diversity in the practices of the various states that a more detailed provi-
sion was not used. In the North Carolina convention one speaker stated that the rule
could not have been drawn more narrowly without changing the rule of some of the
states. Id.
72. Id. at 32.
73. See id.
74. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73.
a jury selection district, regardless of whether it is a state-wide district
or only a neighborhood district, that is the district from which the jury
must be drawn to try a crime committed in that district. 75 This view
clearly protects diversity in state jury selection practices.
The foregoing analysis faces difficulties resulting from the long
standing position of the Supreme Court that the trial provisions of the
Bill of Rights applied only to federal courts.76  By the same token, the
analysis casts some doubt upon the Supreme Court's traditional interpre-
tation of the framers' intent. Since the First Congress evidently believed
that whatever it did with the vicinage requirement would affect state
practices, it may well be that the Sixth Amendment was originally
intended to apply directly to the states. '77
Even assuming the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury was
never intended to apply directly to the states but applies only because
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Duncan v. Louisiana,7" a second
possible explanation not employed by the Jones majority can be made
for the majority position that the federal definition of a district should
not control the vicinage requirement in state courts. In Johnson v.
Louisiana,7 9 Mr. Justice Powell expressed the view that the Fourteenth
Amendment should not be seen as incorporating every element of the
Sixth Amendment." This position had been espoused earlier by Chief
Justice Burger 8 ' and by Justices Stewart,"' Harlan8 3 and Fortas. 4  Ad-
vocates of this view believe that only those elements of federal jury
practice which are essential to due process should be applied to state
75. See text accompanying note 23-24 supra.
76. See, e.g., Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Gaines v. Washington,
277 U.S. 81 (1928); Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908); Barron v. Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
77. As early as 1825 William Rawle argued that the provisions of the Sixth
Amendment which require notice of the charges, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses and right to counsel applied to the states. W. RAwLE,
A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 125 (1825). Rawle
himself did not think the vicinage provision applied to the states, id. at 124-25, but
his willingness to accept the application to the states of some parts of the Bill of
Rights, id. at 120-30, suggests that the intent of the framers is not quite so obvious
as Supreme Court cases have suggested.
78. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
79. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
80. 406 U.S. at 366-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 76-77 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing).
82. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 143-45 (1970) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring).
83. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171-93 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing).
84. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211-15 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
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jury practice.8 5 The Jones majority acknowledged that the vicinage
requirement was an "essential feature,"8 6 and thus even under Justice
Powell's view the vicinage requirement would apply to the states. How-
ever, it is not obvious that a federal definition of the jury-selection dis-
trict is essential to due process. The better interpretation, this ex-
planation would continue, is that in state courts the district which
"has been previously ascertained by law" is a district defined by state
legislation. The main criminal function of federal courts is to try cases
in which the entire country has an interest, 7 while the states have
been left with state-wide and local concerns. Thus it seems appro-
priate that the nature of the vicinage requirements which are applicable
to each level of the judiciary should differ. Although Justice Powell's
view of the Fourteenth Amendment has not yet been embraced by a
majority of the present Supreme Court, explicitly permitting the states
to control jury vicinage districts would be a particularly appropriate
expression of the potentially beneficial fruits of this view.
The Jones majority may have had in mind Justice Powell's view
that not all elements of federal jury practice apply to the states when it
located in the Sixth Amendment the purportedly immutable mandate
that the "district, however large or small, from which the jury is drawn
must include the area wherein the crime was committed. s88  If this
view of Justice Powell played a part in the majority's locating this man-
date, it is unfortunate that it failed to clearly delineate its reasoning.
Other state courts will now have to utilize other parts of the Jones
decision and examine the history of the Sixth Amendment themselves in
order to decide jury vicinage issues.
Prior California and Federal Vicinage Decisions
Probably because no authority exists, neither the majority nor the
dissent of the Jones court cited any compelling state or federal authority
for its interpretation of the vicinage requirement. Of the few Cali-
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (Powell, J., con-
curring); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 213 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
86. 9 Cal. 3d at 551, 510 P.2d at 709, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
87. The Constitution defined treason and authorized Congress to punish counter-
feiting, piracies and felonies on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. III, § 3. Early federal criminal legislation dealt with
revenue fraud, interference with federal justice, arson of a federal vessel, extortion by
a federal officer and theft by an employee from the Bank of the United States. See,
e.g., Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 46. In modem times, except where
it is used to punish conduct of local concern with which local authorities are unable
or unwilling to cope, federal jurisdiction is used primarily to punish antisocial conduct
of distinctly federal concern or to secure compliance with federal administrative regula-
tion. See Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 L.
& CoNTEMP. PRon. 64, 64-66 (1948).
88. 9 Cal. 3d at 554, 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
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fornia appellate decisions on geographic discrimination, all but People
v. McDowell,89 relied upon by the dissent, were decided before Duncan
v. Louisiana9" held that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was
applicable to the states.9 McDowell, a court of appeals decision, in-
volved an unsuccessful challenge to the exclusion from jury-selection
pools of residents who lived over twenty-five miles from the court-
house.92 Although in McDowell the challenge to geographical ex-
clusion was denied, Jones does not contradict that decision because the
crime in McDowell was committed within the area from which the
jurors were drawn.93
While the federal courts, and particularly the United States Su-
preme Court, have decided many jury selection cases 94 in the ninety-
three years since the first successful Fourteenth Amendment jury se-
lection challenge in Strauder v. West Virginia,95 the few Supreme Court
decisions relevant to geographical discrimination have been inconclu-
sive as authority for the vicinage requirement in state courts. Three
old Supreme Court cases address the vicinage issue, 0 but because they
all involve federal district court juries, they are precedent only for in-
terpretation of the federal court vicinage requirement. If these cases
had addressed the policy considerations behind the vicinage require-
ment or the historical basis for the requirement, perhaps such discus-
sion would have given the Jones court direction in determining the ap-
plicability of federal vicinage to state courts. However, because none
of the decisions explored these considerations, the Jones court had no
Supreme Court direction for its determination of the proper district
for state court vicinage purposes.
89. 27 Cal. App. 3d 864, 104 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972).
90. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
91. See, e.g., People v. York, 207 Cal. App. 2d 880, 24 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1962);
Anderson v. Southern Pac. Co., 129 Cal. App. 206, 18 P.2d 703 (1933); People v.
Vaughn, 14 Cal. App. 201, 111 P. 620 (1910).
92. See 27 Cal. App. 3d at 871-75, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 185-88.
93. See id. at 868, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 183. Fontana, where the crime took place,
is less than fifteen miles from San Bernardino. The jurors were drawn from within
a twenty-five mile radius from San Bernardino.
94. Most of these Supreme Court decisions have been decided on racial or eco-
nomic discrimination grounds. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (racial);
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (racial); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217 (1946) (economic).
95. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See Kairys, supra note 41, at 772.
96. In Lewis v. United States, 279 U.S. 63 (1929), the trial in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Oklahoma was upheld even though residents of Tulsa, where the crime was
committed, were removed by the clerk and jury commissioner from consideration for
jury duty in that court. In Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918), it was
held proper to draw jurors from only one division of the federal district, but there
was no indication whether the crime was committed in that division. Agnew v. United
States, 165 U.S. 36 (1897) held that it was proper to draw jurors from only one county
of the federal district even though the crime was committed in another county.
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Despite language indicating the impermissibility of geographical
discrimination,97 such discrimination has never been held to be un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court. In fact, lower federal courts have
upheld various manifestations of geographical discrimination, even as
recently as 1972.9s However, the different lower federal courts have
taken various positions regarding vicinage issues: around the turn of
the century some held that jurors need not be drawn from the whole
federal district;99 others held that even if divisions within the district
had been created, the jury might still be drawn from the whole dis-
trict.100 United States v. Wan Lee,101 cited approvingly by the Jones
majority,10 2 is the only case which has indicated that if juries were
drawn from each division they must have been used only to try crimes
committed within that particular division. 0 3  However, since the
statement was dictum in Wan Lee, a case decided in the nineteenth
century, that language is certainly not compelling authority today. In
addition, because all of these lower federal court decisions are from
other jurisdictions none is authority for the Jones court; 04 since they
all involve federal court juries, none would be helpful to the Jones
court in defining state court vicinage.
The Policy Considerations Implicit in Jones
Faced with an inconclusive indication of the framers' intent and
a lack of precedent, the Jones court was given the opportunity to make
a judicial choice. The nature of such choice has been explained by
Professor Julius Stone:
[T]o assert the availability of judicial choices is not the same as
to assert judicial arbitrariness in decision, or even judicial "legis-
lative power" in the sense in which we attribute this to the legis-
97. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (dictum).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972) (upheld con-
viction by jury exclusively from Elkins division of Northern District of West Virginia
for crime committed in Parkersburg division); United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 860 (1948) (upheld conviction by jury drawn exclu-
sively from the counties of Manhattan, Bronx and Westchester when crime was com-
mitted in Ulster County); Spencer v. United States, 169 F. 562 (8th Cir. 1909) (up-
held conviction even though residents of Polk County, Iowa were automatically excluded
and the crime was committed in Polk County).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Ayres, 46 F. 651 (D.S.D. 1891); United States
v. Wan Lee, 44 F. 707 (N.D. Wash. 1890).
100. See, e.g., Spencer v. United States, 169 F. 562 (8th Cir. 1909); Clement v.
United States, 149 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 206 U.S. 562 (1907).
101. 44 F. 707 (N.D. Wash. 1890).
102. 9 Cal. 3d at 554 n.5, 510 P.2d at 711 n.5, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351 n.5.
103. See 44 F. at 708 (dictum). But see United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d
46 (4th Cir. 1972).
104. People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 86, 460 P.2d 129, 132, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457,
460 (1969).
lature. The effect of the exercise of the judicial duty to choose
within the leeways left by stare decisis is, of course, to produce
new law, and control and guide its growth; in this sense it may
be called "creative" or even "legislative". But unlike that of the
parliamentary legislator, the judicial choice is usually between al-
ternative decisions and modes of reaching them presented to thejudge by the authoritative materials of the law. These materials
do, of course, include areas of settled rules which it would require
parliamentary action to overcome. But they also present (espe-
cially at the appellate level) guide posts to alternative solutions
which remain legally open, beyond the settled areas. 105
The majority in Jones cloaked its judicial choice by stating that
it was distilling a constitutional principle from Alvarado v. State and
Maryland v. Brown.10 6  However, since neither lower federal court10 7
nor state court decisions from other jurisdictions'0 8 are binding on Cal-
ifornia courts, the majority's decision must have been based upon pol-
icy considerations. Like the majority, the dissent relied only upon an
inconclusive indication of the framers' intent and upon cases which
were not binding upon the court.10 9 Thus its decision must also have
been based largely upon policy considerations.
Since both the majority and dissenting positions appear to be
based primarily on policy, the obvious question is what policy consid-
erations motivated each side. The dissent expressly indicated that it
was concerned that the majority's holding could "significantly impede
the administration of criminal justice in Los Angeles.""'  Unfortu-
nately, the only clue to relevant policy considerations provided by the
majority was its extensive reliance upon Alvarado."' The majority's
obvious sympathy with the Alvarado holding can best be understood
as a recognition of the diversity of experience and attitudes of various
racial groups and as a belief that this fact should take precedence over
mere administrative convenience. But the implications of the major-
ity's language go even further and indicate that attributes of particular
105. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAwYERS' REASONINGS 281 (1964).
106. 9 Cal. 3d at 553, 510 P.2d at 710-11, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51, citing Mary-
land v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969), and Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891
(Alas. 1971).
107. People v. Bradley, I Cal. 3d 80, 86, 460 P.2d 129, 132, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457,
460 (1969).
108. People v. Hayne, 83 Cal. 111, 119, 23 P. 1, 4 (1890).
109. United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972) and United States
v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970), are both lower federal court decisions from
other juridictions. State v. Kappos, 189 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 982 (1972), is a state court decision from another jurisdiction whereas People
v. McDowell, 27 Cal. App. 3d 864, 104 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972), is a California Court
of Appeals case and is therefore not binding on the California Supreme Court.
110. 9 Cal. 3d at 564, 510 P.2d at 718, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
111. See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra & notes 128-32 infra.
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geographic groups exist which prohibit those groups from being inter-
changed for mere convenience in administration. 112
Neither the majority nor the dissent critically examined the policy
questions which were important to the position each side took. Thus,
there was no explicit confrontation between the policies which each side
considered important. Instead, the open confrontation was between
each side's interpretation of the framers' intent and choice of cases
upon which to rely. Any discussion of the underlying policies was
left to commentators and future decisions in the area.
Hoow Should the "District" be Defined?
A suitable answer to the question of how the Sixth Amendment
vicinage requirement should be interpreted is more important than
what is revealed by Jones's inconclusive analysis of the incomplete leg-
islative history of the Sixth Amendment" 3 and its review of contra-
dictory decisions from other jurisdictions." 4  Unfortunately, Jones did
not answer that question. The following discussion of population
growth and the legislative response, trends toward decentralization, and
the interests of both the accused and society in the jury and the op-
portunity for all members of society to serve on juries therefore at-
tempts to set forth some of the policy considerations the court should
have discussed.
Population Growth, Legislative Responses and Trends Toward
Decentralization
A cursory examination of population comparisons, California leg-
islative action and federal congressional action suggests that the Jones
majority made the better decision in choosing the narrower definition
of a jury district. Federal judicial districts of between 55,000 and
400,000 were deemed appropriate in 1789.1 5 Under the minority's
view in Jones, 10.35 million people would be included in the "district
wherein the crime was committed." 6 This vast disparity alone should
112. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 53-64 supra.
114. See notes 106-109 and accompanying text supra.
115. In 1790 the population of West Virginia was just over 55,500; Virginia, the
most populous state, had a population of nearly 700,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, HISToRIcAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 13 (1960). The Judiciary Act of
1789 created thirteen districts: one district for each state except Massachusetts and
Virginia, which were each given two. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73.
116. The seven counties embraced by the Central District of California, Los An-
geles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura,
had a total population of approximately 10.35 million in 1970. See CALiFoN.I& DEP'T
OF FINANCE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA STATIsTIcAL ABsTRAcr 9 (1972).
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raise doubts about the wisdom of the minority's understanding of the
appropriate vicinage requirement.
Apparently in response to population growth, the California leg-
islature created the first branch court in 1925. This action demon-
strated its doubt that one judicial district was adequate for Los Angeles
County. The legislature reaffirmed its doubt during the succeeding
three decades by endorsing the continued haphazard growth of the
branch court system.' 17  In addition, the Congress of the United States
recently indicated its support for a narrowed concept of jury vicinage.
In the Declaration of Policy section of the Federal Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968, Congress stated:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal
courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to . . . juries
selected at random from a fair cross section of the community
in the district or division wherein the court convenes. It is fur-
ther the policy . . . that all citizens shall have the opportunity to
be considered for service on . . . juries in the district courts . . .
and shall have an obligation to serve .... 118
117. The first branch superior court was established in Long Beach in 1925. The
first bills designed to create branch courts provided that there must be a branch court
in any city of at least 50,000 population whose city hall was fifteen or more miles
from the county courthouse. For over thirty years the distance and population require-
ments were juggled by branch court bills phrased generally, but designed to create spe-
cific branch courts. SECOND PARTIAL REPORT OF THE JOINT JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 26-28 (1959). By 1957 there were ten branches in ad-
dition to the Civic Center Court in downtown Los Angeles. TOWN HALL-THE TRIAL
COURTS OF THE Los ANGELES METROPOLITAN AREA 13-15 (1957). As of 1972 there
were a total of nine geographical areas constituting specifically named districts, of
which the Central District was one. Adams v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 3d 719,
722, 104 Cal. Rptr. 144, 146-47 (1972). The legislature may have been motivated by
a concern for administrative convenience rather than by a concern that the judicial
process not become too far removed from the communities as they expanded. However,
the legislature should be given the benefit of an assumption that the latter concern
was given at least some attention.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970) (emphasis added). It is unfortunate that this act,
which was apparently intended in part to insure local juries in the divisions, probably
caused the Northern District of California to take steps in the other direction. Before
the act there was an Oakland division and a Eureka division in addition to those in
San Jose and in San Francisco; most of the trials, however, were transferred to the
San Jose and San Francisco divisions. Rather than altering this practice of transferring
trials and providing Oakland and Eureka division residents an opportunity to serve on
juries in their respective divisions, the Northern District has consolidated these two
divisions with the San Francisco division. The result has been that now residents of
the old Eureka division are denied a realistic opportunity to serve on juries in the
Northern District. See Second Amended Plan of the U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist.
of Cal. for the Random Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors (filed Feb. 22, 1973, Clerk,
U.S.D.C., S.F.) [hereinafter cited as Second Amended Plan]. See generally notes 145-
54 infra.
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In determining that juries should be selected from a cross-section of
the community in the division, the Congress was recommending a
smaller jury selection district than the federal district which the Jones
dissent found appropriate. The focus in the provision on litigants and
citizens negates any possible argument that administrative convenience
is the only reason for the division of twenty-four states into more than
one federal district 19 and the further segmenting of some of those
districts into divisions.1 20
Thus population growth, state legislative action and federal policy
all point to the desirability of choosing the narrower definition of a
jury district for vicinage purposes. Such a narrowing would also com-
port with the trend in many other areas of society towards local control
and decentralization. 1 2 ' However, the existence of this social trend
by itself should add nothing to the reasons for narrowing the district.
A good argument can be made that the trend in these areas is not a
result of any inherent advantages of local control so much as it is a
reaction to failures in centralized control. 22 The important question is
not what trends are present in society today, but rather what society
needs from the jury system and whether the system is meeting those
needs.
In determining societal needs with respect to the size of the com-
munity from which a jury should be drawn, two significant interests
must be weighed. The first interest is that of the accused; for a long
time it was the only interest which the Supreme Court recognized.' 23
The other is the interest of the general community, or more specifically
the community where the crime was committed. An examination of
the interest of the accused leads to the conclusion that the community's
interest is the more important interest to consider.
119. See ADMINISTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs, DIRECTORY OF
UNITED STATES COURT OFFIciALS, 13-85 (1972).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972); Second
Amended Plan, supra note 118, at 1. See also Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,
28 U.S.C. § 1869(e)(1970).
121. Education is perhaps the most discussed field experiencing this trend. See
generally R. BENDrIER, THE PoLrIcs OF SCHOOLS (1969); COMMuNrIY CONTROL OF
SCHOOLS (H. Levin ed. 1970); EDUCATION AND SOCIAL POLICY (C. Bowers, I. Housego
& D. Dyke eds. 1970). The trend can also be seen in proposals to reform the correc-
tional system in California. See S.B. 391 H§ 1810, 1825 (March 7, 1973). It is also
evident in the Federal Revenue Sharing Proposals. See State and Local Fiscal Assist-
ance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. H§ 1221-63 (Supp. II, 1972).
122. See Lipset, The Ideology of Local Control, in EDUCATION AND SOCIAL POLICY
21-32 (C. Bowers, I. Housego & D. Dyke eds. 1970). The movements from local to
central control and then back to local control in education were described by Professor
Seymour Lipset as reactions to the failures of the incumbent system.
123. Compare Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970) with Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The Interest of the Accused
If a consensus existed among accused persons that either a small
jury district or a large jury district was preferred, the interest of the
accused would be an important factor in determining how the Sixth
Amendment district should be defined. However, it is unlikely that
any such consensus exists. Instead, probably the only accurate gen-
eralization about preferences among defendants is that they prefer the
jury which is most likely to acquit or to give a light sentence.
Whether an accused's preferred community will be the most local or
the least local probably depends upon the characteristics of the indi-
vidual defendant and the individual crime.
For example, a defendant with a good local reputation who has
been accused of committing a crime in his own neighborhood that is
not considered dangerous or morally wrong by the community would
prefer a locally selected jury. On the other hand, if his reputation were
bad or if the crime were dangerous or considered morally wrong by
the community, he might prefer as few local residents as possible. In
addition, even if the jury were neutral toward the individual and the
crime, knowledge of local conditions could work against the defend-
ant. The University of Chicago Jury Project's study of the operation
of the jury examined a case where having a local jury was detrimental
to the defendant. The researchers found that one defendant was con-
victed because several jurors "knew" that he was lying when he said
he was not familiar with a tavern that the jurors knew was only two
blocks from his home. -12 4  Thus, the multiplicity of factual circum-
stances coupled with the general self-interest of the accused makes it
impossible to generalize about the preferred jury vicinage requirement
from the viewpoint of the accused.
The Interest of the Community
The more important question is which jury vicinage requirement
most nearly satisfies the interests of the community. In other words,
is it better for society to require only that jurors be drawn from any-
where within the federal judicial district, or to require them to be
drawn from the smaller districts designated by state legislation as jury
selection districts? Stated in general terms, should the jury be made
up predominately of people who can think of themselves as members of
an amorphous group of citizens and who thus can view the facts with
the detachment of persons not directly threatened by the crime, or
should it be composed of people at the other extreme who live so close
to the crime that they identify with the victim and thereby possibly
124. Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Requirement: An Empirical Look, 45
NEB. L. REV. 99, 101-02, 106 (1966).
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add an element of personal involvement to their decisions? Or is there
some better solution between these extremes?
One commentator has suggested that the answer to these ques-
tions should depend upon the nature of the crime.'25 The basic theme
of this suggestion is that the jury should reflect the community which
is affected by the crime. This theme was explained by contrasting two
examples: the first was that of a defendant accused of the murder of
an anonymous person who had been walking the streets of a city.
The only reason for this murder was to take the victim's money. It
was suggested that this crime should be tried by a jury drawn from the
whole metropolitan area because that assailant might kill anyone else
walking anywhere in the city. The commentator contrasted this mur-
der with the murder of a husband by a wife. That act threatens a
much smaller group, probably only those who would have occasion to
deal with the woman in the future on a personal level. Thus, that
crime should be tried by a jury drawn from that smaller threatened
group.120  The adoption of this suggestion would create staggering ad-
ministrative problems which might require a hearing simply to deter-
mine what jury vicinage is relevant to the particular crime. 12 7  This
proposal does, however, point out one important consideration for de-
termining the proper size of the jury selection district. That is, jurors
should live close enough to the location of the crime so that they be-
lieve that they have a stake in their decision. Jurors could then identify
with both the victim and a possible innocent defendant.
An extreme example of a jury which could not identify with either
the defendant or victim and thus had no stake in the decision occurred
in Alvarado v. State,18 relied upon by the Jones majority. Cloyd Al-
varado, a Native Alaskan, was one-quarter Aleut by blood and had
lived over half his life in the small village of his alleged crime. '2  His
trial was held in Anchorage, 450 air miles away from the village.
By virtue of a fifteen mile jury selection radius, nearly all the residents
of the native villages were excluded from the relevant jury selection
pool. 30 There were many drastic cultural differences between the
125. J. Van Dyke, A Modem Definition of "Jury of Peers" 17 (paper presented
for discussion at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Dec. 2, 1970,
to be published as part of a forthcoming book).
126. Id. at 17-18.
127. Not only would it be necessary to determine what group of people would
be affected by such a crime, but if an issue of motive or identity were involved, that
issue would also have to be resolved before the jury could be selected. For instance,
if the actual motive in the first example in the text accompanying note 126 supra were
a family feud, or if the actual assailant in the second example were a stranger, then
the affected group in each would be drastically changed.
128. 486 P.2d 891 (Alas. 1971).
129. Id. at 893.
130. Id. at 895, 900, 903.
City of Anchorage and Alvarado's native village, Chignik. The Al-
varado court highlighted some of these differences: In Chignik "there
is no television or running water; there are no roads or cars. Principal
means of access to the village is by a weekly plane. Chignik's only
industry is a single cannery, which operates during the summer." '131
These cultural differences were, in the words of the Jones majority,
"dramatically illustrative of one of the purposes of the constitutional
rule [that] a criminal defendant is entitled to a jury drawn from a jury
panel which includes jurors residing in the geographical area where
the alleged crime occurred. 132
In contrast to Alvarado, the Community Youth Responsibility
Program (CYRP) in East Palo Alto, California, presents an example
of the use of a "jury" which has a stake in its decision and which there-
fore can identify with both the victim and the defendant. 13  About
fifteen percent of the juvenile arrests in the unincorporated, predom-
inantly black area of East Palo Alto are referred to CYRP."4 Except
for victimless crimes, which proceed directly to counseling, the referred
arrests are presented to a community panel consisting of four adults
and three youths.' 35 The panel informally hears evidence, decides
guilt or innocence,' and then recommends counseling, tutoring and/
or work tasks for periods of time which are determined by the panel."'
Members of the community created this program to meet a need
which they felt was not adequately met by county institutions such
as the police, courts and probation departments."18  In addition to
combatting crime, the program has given an opportunity to many lo-
cal people for involvement with the community's youth and the com-
munity itself. A natural result of the program has been an elevation
of the community's respect for at least the juvenile component of the
criminal justice system."39
131. Id. at 894.
132. 9 Cal. 3d at 554, 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
133. Information regarding this program is contained in untitled reports of the
Community Youth Responsibility Program, 2220 University Ave., East Palo Alto, Cal.
94303, covering the period 1970-72 [hereinafter cited as CYRP untitled reports]. Much
valuable information was obtained in an interview with Robert B. Evans, Program Di-
rector of the Community Youth Responsibility Program, in East Palo Alto, July 25,
1973 [hereinafter cited as CYRP interview].
134. See CYRP untitled reports, supra note 133.
135. Id.
136. Of 200 cases, only three juveniles were acquitted in the first two years of
the program. According to the program director, most of the others admitted their
guilt in the hearing. Id.
137. Often the penalty, or work task, is performing labor which is related to the
offense. Examples of the tasks are repairing broken windows and replanting a flower
bed tramped in a burglary. Id.
138. Id.
139. CYRP interview, supra note 133. The success of CYRP in reducing crime
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The CYRP arrangement is susceptible to the criticism that it
presents a jury which is far from impartial. 140 One possible rebuttal
to that criticism would contend that CYRP's only partiality is its con-
cern for the community's welfare. However, the objection that a
narrow jury vicinage requirement may lead to an inability to empanel
an impartial jury is serious and should be dealt with more fully. One
response is that the state legislatures can alleviate the problem by draw-
ing districts large enough to minimize the likelihood that jurors will be
partial. But a more cogent response is that even if the jury districts
are drawn narrowly, the defendant is protected by his right to a change
of venue.1
4 1
The dramatic contrast between the Alvarado jury and the CYRP
"jury" suggests that even if neither extreme meets all society's needs,
at least a good compromise may exist. It is not the function of this
note to suggest at what precise point between the extremes that com-
promise should fall. However, it should be clear that the Jones ma-
jority's decision allows for that compromise to be made by state legis-
latures. The state legislature is free to draw jury selection districts
smaller than East Palo Alto or as large as the federal districts. But
once the jury selection district is defined, the Jones holding requires
that the jury for crimes committed in that district must be drawn from
it. If the Jones dissent had been adopted, even though the legislature
had defined certain jury selection districts, trials could have been con-
ducted before a jury drawn from anywhere within the federal judicial
district. Thus, the Jones majority's position furnishes a much greater
opportunity for the legislature to satisfy societal needs regarding jury
is difficult to assess for two major reasons: first, the sensitive and concerned treatment
of offenders probably reduces the percentage of crimes which go unreported and sec-
ond, crime trends are the product of many social forces. See PROGRESS REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE A-19 to
21 (1969). However, at least in the area of recidivism the program has had excellent
results. Whereas the recidivism rate in East Palo Alto before the program began was
nearly 80 percent, the program has a rate of only 30-32 percent in its fourth year
of operation. See CYRP untitled reports & CYRP interview, supra note 133. Naturally,
these figures may not be exactly comparable because not all of the juvenile crimes in
East Palo Alto are referred to CYRP. For example, hard drug addiction and crimes
by drug addicts are not handled by the program; these crimes may well have a higher
recidivism rate. But even if these figures represent only a gross comparison, they indi-
cate that the rate is very likely to be lower in the program. The simple fact that
the juvenile offenders work out their problems in their own environment with peer as-
sistance would certainly make such an improvement seem likely.
140. The Sixth Amendment contains a guarantee that trial be by an impartial jury.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
141. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1033 (West Supp. 1973), provides that "[in a criminal
action pending in the superior court, the court shall order a change of venue: (a)
On motion of the defendant, to another county when it appears that there is a reason-
able likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county." "
selection districts than the dissent's position does. It allows a balance
between the dual social interests of selecting juries which have a stake
in the outcome of the trial and of empanelling impartial juries.
Opportunity for Individuals to Serve on a Jury
Besides furnishing a jury with a greater stake in the outcome, es-
tablishing small jury selection districts for Sixth Amendment vicinage
purposes can also provide a greater distribution of the opportunity for
individual members of society to serve as jurors. The opportunity to
serve on a jury could, in turn, have a beneficial effect upon each in-
dividual who served. In writing about American democracy, Alexis de
Tocqueville observed: "The jury contributes powerfully to form the
judgment and to increase the natural intelligence of a people; and this,
in my opinion, is its greatest advantage.' 1 42  A similar understanding
has been expressed by the Administrative Director of the Circuit Court
of Cook County: "A citizen's experience as a juror will contribute
substantially to his overall impression of justice prevailing in his com-
munity."' 3  One of the black jurors who was questioned during the
University of Chicago Jury Project's study graphically expressed his re-
action to jury service:
I was extremely proud. . . . It was . . . one of the proudest
moments of my life. . . . I think it's really a wonderful way in
which citizens . . . can participate in the day to day administra-
tion of justice. . . . I got a sense of really belonging to the
American community.' 44
The opportunity for citizens to benefit from and enjoy this im-
portant experience can be affected by the interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment vicinage requirement. The larger the district for vici-
nage purposes, the less likely it is that each resident of the district will
have a realistic opportunity to serve. Both federal 5 and California
courts146 espouse the general principle that citizens from all geographic
areas must have the opportunity to serve on juries. However, the
142. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 285 (P. Bradley ed., H.
Reeve transl. 1945).
143. Mackoff, Jury Selections for the Seventies, 55 JUDICATURE 104 (1971). Ac-
cord, Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 903 (Alas. 1971).
144. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 26.
145. Compare text accompanying note 118 supra, with Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1869(e) (1970). Section 1869(e) makes clear that each
county or similar political subdivision must be included in some division of the federal
district.
146. Thirteen of the fourteen superior courts responding to a questionnaire sent
to fourteen of the largest counties in California, on the basis of land area, stated that
they constructed their jury pools of residents from all parts of the county. Questionnaire
For Superior Courts-Largest Counties, mailed July 23, 1973 by the Hastings Law
Journal [hereinafter cited as Ouestionnaire-Largest Counties].
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
February 1974 SIXTH AMENDMENT VICINAGE REQUREMENT 571
professed principle of equal opportunity to serve on a jury can be un-
dercut drastically by the combination of three factors. The first factor
is the maintenance of large districts with only one or two court loca-
tions in each district.147 The second is the provision for automatic
excuses from jury duty for people who live beyond a certain dis-
tance.148 The third factor is the failure to provide per diem pay which
is sufficient to support a juror for an overnight stay. 49 Since travel
time may be too great to make the trip daily and expenses too great to
stay overnight, by the combination of those three factors some mem-
bers of society are denied a realistic opportunity to serve on juries be-
cause of the location of their homes. Each juror is forced to choose
whether to exercise his right to an automatic excuse or to take the
personal financial loss accompanying jury duty far from home.
This situation can be remedied in at least two ways: first, by
paying realistic expenses and wages for out-of-town jurors 50 and, sec-
ond, by tailoring jury districts so that crimes in remote areas would be
tried in those areas by juries of "local" residents.' 5' These remedies
could be employed either separately or in combination. California's
Inyo County offers evidence that the first proposal is feasible. Rather
than excluding persons who live a considerable distance from the court-
house, that county pays lodging expenses for jurors who reside over
seventy-five miles from the county seat. 52 While both proposals
147. See note 118 supra.
148. The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (1970)
allows district courts to fix the distances beyond which individuals will be excused on
request. The distance is thirty-five miles for the Northern District of California. Sec-
ond Amended Plan, supra note 118, at 5. At least four of California's largest counties
give automatic excuses to persons who live beyond a specified distance; that distance
ranges between forty and sixty miles from the courthouse. See Questionnaire-Largest
Counties, supra note 146.
149. The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 doubled the basic jury fee from
ten dollars to twenty dollars per diem in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (1970),
amending 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (Supp. I, 1965). In California, the fees vary from county
to county but the range is from five to ten dollars per day. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 76000-
58 (West Supp. 1973).
150. The Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, approved by the House of Dele-
gates of the American Bar Association on Feb. 9, 1971, prohibits automatic exemp-
tions for people living beyond a specified distance and allows excuses only on a show-
ing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience or public necessity. It also provides that
per diem payments should be made at current wages. McKusick & Boxer, Uniform
Jury Selection and Service Act, 8 HAnv. J. LEGIs. 280, 289-92 (1971).
151. The idea of tailoring districts to give opportunity to previously underrepre-
sented groups to serve on juries was suggested in a different context in Note, The Case
for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 547-48 (1970). The author suggested that, in order
to insure that black communities have significant representation on trial juries, at
least in Northern urban areas the districts should be drawn so that each black com-
munity would constitute a vicinage.
152. Questionnaire-Largest Counties, supra note 146.
would reasonably enable all citizens to serve on juries, the second has
the advantage that the average juror would have a greater interest in
the outcome of the trial.15 The second proposal also has the further
advantage of lessening the impact of cultural differences.'
Summary of the Advantages of Small Jury Selection Districts
There appear to be at least four advantages of smaller jury selec-
tion districts. First, there would be advantages to the operation of the
trial itself by having jurors with a real stake in the outcome of the
proceedings.1 5' Second, there would be advantages to the community
which could become more involved in the judicial process. 56 Third,
there would be advantages to society in general created by the more
broadly shared respect for the judicial system. 7 Fourth, and finally,
there would be advantages to the individual citizen, particularly in a
remote area, who would have a better chance to serve as a juror.'-3
The major disadvantage would seem to be mainly in increased admin-
istrative difficulties. 9
Since there was no binding authority, at least some of these pol-
icy considerations surely must have been among those with which the
Jones court grappled in coming to its decision. It is unfortunate for
other courts that the Jones majority and dissent did not more fully and
explicitly explore these considerations.
Four Potential Implications of People v. Jones for the
California Criminal Justice System
There are at least four kinds of factual situations in California
which Jones may affect. The first, of course, is the situation involving
the transfer of a trial to another district for reasons of administrative
convenience.' Unless the jury is transferred with the trial or a
153. See text accompanying notes 125-39 supra.
154. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
155. See text accompanying notes 126-39 supra.
156. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
157. Id.
158. See text accompanying notes 142-54 supra.
159. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
160. Jones was only one among many defendants from the Central District who
were tried by juries from the Southwest district; from May, 1970, until the fall of 1972
all trials from the 77th Street precinct were transferred. People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d
546, 548, 510 P.2d 705, 707, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 347 (1973). At least seven Califor-
nia counties in addition to Los Angeles have branch courts. Three of these counties
do not conduct jury trials at the branch courts, but the other four could be affected
by the Jones ruling in similar trial transfers. One county has admitted to transfers
for reasons other than the inability to empanel an impartial jury. Questionnaire for
Superior Courts-Most Populous Counties, mailed July 23, 1973, by the Hastings Law
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county-wide jury is used, Jones clearly means that a Sixth Amendment
challenge to the competency of the jury would have to be sustained.
A second kind of situation, closely related to Jones, would be one
in which the trial is transferred to another district upon the insistance
of the prosecution for reasons of adverse local reaction. 161  In that
type of case, the Jones majority's approval of dictum in Maryland v.
Brown 62 would indicate that, absent enormous administrative burdens,
either the jurors should be transferred from the district of the crime
to the district of the trial, or, alternatively, a county-wide jury should
be used.
The third factual situation upon which Jones will undoubtedly
have some impact is the type exemplified by People v. McDowell.16 3
San Bernardino, the county where McDowell was tried, is one of at least
three counties that automatically exclude from jury service residents
who live outside a specified radius from the county seat.' 64 While
such a system is not rendered invalid per se by Jones, a defendant
whose crime was committed outside that radius appears to have a valid
constitutional argument after Jones. It would be a difficult task for a
lower California court to ignore the supreme court's assertion that it
is an immutable mandate of the Sixth Amendment that the district from
which the jury is drawn must include the area of the crime.' 6 5
A slight variation on the McDowell situation arises when, rather
than a mandatory exclusion, there is an automatic excuse upon request
for people who live beyond a certain distance.' 66 A defendant whose
crime was committed in the area of the automatic excuses could argue
that this was, in effect, depriving him of a jury of the district of the
crime because residents of the area of the crime had no reasonable op-
portunity to serve on the jury.'6 7  The per diem allotment and the
percentage of excuses would probably be important factors in resolving
such an argument.
Journal (nine of ten counties responding). This problem could be remedied by trans-
ferring jurors with the trial, or by using county-wide juries.
161. See text accompanying note 46-49 supra.
162. 9 Cal. 3d at 553, 510 P.2d at 710, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 350, citing Maryland
v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
163. 27 Cal. App. 3d 864, 104 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972).
164. The other counties are Tulare and Imperial. Questionnaire-Largest Coun-
ties, supra note 146.
165. 9 Cal. 3d at 554, 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351. A closely related
factual situation arose in State v. Kappos, 189 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 982 (1972). There the judicial district included the whole county, but the
jurors were drawn from only one city in the county. This situation would likewise
fall within the holding and language of Jones if the crime were committed outside the
city.
166. See note 148 supra.
167. See text accompanying notes 145-154 supra.
The Jones decision has already been applied once by the Second
Appellate District of the California Court of Appeals. In People v.
Casillas,16 8 the defendant's conviction was overturned although he had
been tried by the court and not a jury. The court of appeals held
that the defendant did not waive his right to a jury trial in the Central
District of Los Angeles; he had agreed to be tried by the court in the
Southeast District only after the trial court had denied his motion to be
transferred to the Central District. 169 Thus, Jones has already had an
impact, and probably will continue to have some impact upon defend-
ants and courts, at least until jury selection and trial transfer proce-
dures in California begin to conform to Jones's requirements.
Conclusion
The California Supreme Court has now added its name to the
short list of courts that have attempted to define the Sixth Amend-
ment vicinage requirement. The Jones decision will be important to
California; it will ensure that trials are not transferred away from local
juries and that residents of all parts of the state will be considered for
jury duty in at least some cases. Unfortunately, the majority failed to
explain a crucial step in its reasoning, that is, how it determined that
there was an immutable mandate of the Sixth Amendment that the dis-
trict must include the area where the crime was committed, regardless
of the size of the district. It also failed to explain the policy consider-
ations behind its decision.
The court did, however, come to the better result. Under this de-
cision the opportunity for all citizens to serve on juries will be improved.
In addition, the concept that the jury should be a body concerned with
the matter before it will be enhanced. Finally, rather than having
been forced to accept the versions of jury vicinage districts established
by federal legislation to fulfill the needs of federal courts, the state leg-
islature has been given the opportunity to define jury vicinage districts
to meet the needs of the state's communities.
John E. Darr*
168. 33 Cal. App. 3d 1078, 109 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1973).
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